INTRODUCTION
In spite of the enormous current U. S. trade deficit, many macro economists project that the current account will move back into surplus in the 1990's. This view rests on a scenario that projects a significant real deva l u ation and rapid growth of U. S. ex p o rts. This view, implicitly or ex p l i c i t ly, presupposes a successful resolution of many of the disputes currently being debated within the GATT and places the United States in an environment of expanding world trade. Alternatively, the current round of t rade nego t i ations could end in fa i l u re and the wo rld might then lapse into a p rotectionist env i ronment. The mounting trade deficit has cert a i n ly unleashed p rotectionist sentiments in the United States as import-competing industries cl a m o r for protection from fo reign competitors. If enacted, ex t reme protectionist policies might well induce re t a l i at o ry measures from our major trading part n e rs, ultimat e ly forcing the United States to adjust in an environment of shrinking world trade.
We inve s t i gate the implications of these two diffe rent trade scenarios on the s t ru c t u re and perfo rmance of the U. S. economy. We use a 30-sector computabl e ge n e ral equilibrium (CGE) model bench m a rked to 1988 data. The fi rst adjustment scenario starts from macroeconometric projections for the U. S. economy to 1995 that incorporate an improvement in the trade deficit in an environment of expanding world trade.
In the altern at ive scenario, the U. S. economy adjusts so as to ach i eve the same balance of trade by means of import restrictions, in an environment of shrinking world t ra d e. In analyzing the protectionist scenario, we do two types of ex p e ri m e n t s designed to explore the impact of protectionist policies on the U. S. economy. First, we explore the impact of increased tariff protection for each of seven selected sectors, assuming in each case no other changes in tariffs. The underlying assumption is that p rotectionist political pre s s u re is sector specifi c, and we analy ze wh at happens if a single sector succeeds in obtaining protection, with no other changes in trade policy. Second, we impose an across-the-board tariff of 50 percent, which is added to existing tariffs in all sectors. In this case, the assumption is that there is a general increase in p rotectionist pre s s u re resulting in something like the Smoot-Haw l ey tari ff of 1930. With these experiments, we can compare the impact of sectoral protection with that of across-the-board protection.
The sector-s p e c i fic and ove ra l l -p rotection ex p e riments are run under va ry i n g assumptions about inters e c t o ral capital mobility. For both policy ex p e riments, we assume that capital is sector specifi c, a common assumption in recent trade theory l i t e rat u re, wh i ch emphasizes the role of industry -s p e c i fic fa c t o rs in determining the demand for pro t e c t i o n . 1 We also rep e at the ove ra l l -p rotection policy ex p e ri m e n t assuming capital is freely mobile.
We describe the 30-sector CGE model used in the study, focusing on the model's t re atment of fo reign tra d e, including a new ap p ro a ch to modeling import demand functions. We then briefly review the theoretical properties of a model such as ours, with imperfect substitution for both exports and imports. We then present the forward p rojections to 1995 under the favo rable trade env i ronment and the pro t e c t i o n experiments.
THE CGE MODEL STRUCTURE
This section gives a brief overview of the structure of the model, focusing on the t re atment of trade and omitting the details of the model equations. A complete description of the underlying CGE model can be found in Robinson, Kilkenny, and Hanson (1990) .
A. Suppl y and Demand
The model contains 30 sectors, each producing a composite commodity that can be transformed into an export good or a commodity sold only on the domestic market. Each industry's output is produced according to a constant returns to scale, constant elasticity of substitution (CES) value added function which uses three primary inputs: 28 K. HANSON, S. ROBINSON AND S. TOKARICK labor, capital, and, in the agricultural sector, land. In addition, intermediate inputs are re q u i red according to fi xed input-output coefficients. Sectoral input demands are d e rived from fi rs t -o rder conditions for pro fit maximization. Total endowments of land, labor, and capital are fixed, and average factor prices adjust to equate aggregate supply and demand in each factor market. However, sectoral distortions exist in factor markets. Sectoral factor prices differ from the average factor price, so we capture this difference by a fixed ad valorem wedge.
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A ggregate domestic demand in the model has four components: consumption, i n t e rm e d i ate demand, gove rnment, and investment (including inve n t o ry accumu l ation). The model has three households, with ex p e n d i t u re functions derived from a C o bb-Douglas utility function, yielding fi xed nominal ex p e n d i t u re shares. Each household pays income taxes to the government and saves a proportion of its income, determined by fixed average propensities to save. Intermediate demand is calculated f rom total sectoral outputs, given the fi xe d, input-output coefficients. For the gove rnment, aggregate spending on goods and services is fi xe d, and its sectora l composition is given by fi xed shares. Inve n t o ry demand by sector is a fi xe d proportion of domestic output.
Aggregate investment is either set exogenously from a macro model or is "savings d rive n ." The diffe rence between aggregate investment and inve n t o ry demand rep resents the total ava i l able funds for purchasing new capital goods; that is, fi xe d investment. Expenditure on investment goods by sector is a fixed share of the total funds ava i l able for investment, giving investment demand by sector of destinat i o n . Investment demand by sector of origin is translated from investment demand by sector of destination by using a capital composition matrix.
Aggregate savings is the sum of household saving, government saving, and foreign s av i n g. Household saving is a fi xed fraction of household income. Gove rn m e n t s aving is the diffe rence between gove rnment reve nue from income taxes, tari ff reve nu e, and excise taxes, less gove rnment spending. The model also contains a balance-of-payments constraint in that the value of imports at world prices must equal the value of exports at world prices plus foreign savings, net remittances, and foreign borrowing. In the experiments reported in this paper, we assume that the balance of trade for goods and nonfactor services and hence foreign saving, is fixed exogenously and is given from macro e c o n o m e t ric pro j e c t i o n s .
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In the CGE model, the re a l exchange rate adjusts to achieve equilibrium, given the fixed balance of trade. The model makes the "small country" assumption on the import side, assuming that the United States cannot affect world prices of its imports. On the export side, we assume d ow n wa rd-sloping wo rld demand functions for U. S. agri c u l t u ral ex p o rts. Nonagricultural exports have fixed world prices.
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B. Impor ts
A common feature in trade-focused CGE models is the Armington assumption that i m p o rted and domestic commodities are imperfect substitutes (Armington, 1969) . This treatment is appealing in that it naturally accommodates the presence of two-way trade at the sectoral level, a common observation at the level of aggregation of multisector models. In the usual treatment, imports are combined with domestic commodities according to a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) aggregation function to fo rm a composite commodity. Users of the composite commodity will choose an optimal combination of imports (M) and domestic commodities (D) so as to minimize total expenditure subject to the CES aggregation function. The optimal ratio of import demand to domestic demand for domestic goods is a function of their relative prices, the elasticity of substitution, and the share parameters in the import aggregation functions.
One drawback of using CES aggregation functions is that the expenditure elasticity of import demand is constrained to be one in every sector. Econometric work indic ates that this constraint is stat i s t i c a l ly inap p ro p ri at e. 4 I n s t e a d, for a number of sectors, we specified a more flexible functional form, the almost ideal demand system (AIDS).
5 As a flexible functional form, the AIDS formulation has some advantages over the CES import-aggregation function. It is, however, an approximation. While it has the adva n t age of allowing ex p e n d i t u re elasticities diffe rent from one, it may be inappropriate for analyzing shocks that move import shares a large distance from the initial shares.
We estimated AIDS import demand functions using sectoral time-series data fo r the 1970-86 period. Estimates are for five industries: Petroleum, nondurable goods, durable goods, automobiles, and nonfactor services. We limit the disaggregation of industries to use the current and constant dollar values of imports and exports from the fo reign transactions accounts of the NIPA . 6 We use unpublished BLS data on domestic output, in both current and constant dollars, and subtract the current and constant dollar values of exports to arrive at values for domestic sales.
We estimated AIDS import demand functions for those sectors for which it seemed likely that income elasticities of import demand differed from one, and for which data were readily available. Although we only estimate import demand functions for five sectors, we use the estimated elasticities in twelve sectors of our model. These twelve sectors represent a disaggregation of the five sectors. The elasticity estimates appear in the last two columns of table 1. Our prinicipal objective in using the AIDS functions is to adopt a structure which allows income elasticities of import demand to differ from one, a specification which is typical of most macroeconometric models.
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We use CES import demand functions for the remanining sectors, wh i ch implies unitary income elasticities.
The AIDS fo rmu l ation of the Armington assumption yields an import demand function of the following form:
wh e re Sm is the value share of imports in total ex p e n d i t u re on the composite commodity, Am is the intercept term and represents the base year share when all prices equal 1, γ ln(PD/PM) captures the influence on the import share of changes in relative prices, and β ln(X/X0) captures the income effect. With X0 the real composite demand in the base ye a r, the ratio (X/X0) is the growth in demand. Since total ex p e n d i t u re on the composite commodity, P X, must equal P M M + P D D, re a l composite demand, X, can be written:
The usual ap p ro a ch is to define P as a cost function of P D and P M, using either a Cobb-Douglas, CES, or translog functional form. We use a CES function, mainly to be consistent with our tre atment in the non-AIDS sectors, since this is the simplest extension of the existing nesting structure. In theory, the appropriate form for the price index P is a cost function which is dual to the AIDS functions, that is, the dual translog cost function. In practice, econometric estimation of the AIDS functions is facilitated by using a price index which can be e a s i ly calculated prior to estimation. This ap p ro a ch was used by Stone (1954) and Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) , who assumed that if prices are relatively collinear, "P will be approximately proportional to any appropriately defined price index." These a u t h o rs assume that P is pro p o rtional to a price index P*, known as Stone's index , where and Sk is the budget share for good k. The advantage of using P* is that it can be easily calculated, making the budget share equations much easier to estimate than translog models. While it is true that P* is an approximation to P, in empirical work such as the type undertaken here, this approximation turns out to be a good one, as demonstrated by Deaton and Muellbauer(1980) . Furthermore, Green and note that using the translog form for P results in econometric problems. First, use of the translog form for P causes the AIDS model to become nonlinear in the parameters. Second, multicollinearity might be a problem. The authors suggest that Stone's index be used to overcome these difficulties.
The income elasticity of demand, ε y m , and the elasticity of substitution betwe e n i m p o rts and domestic commodities, σ, are re l ated to the para m e t e rs γ and β in the AIDS equation by the following formulae: 7 ALTERNATIVE TRADE STRATEGIES 31
C. Exports
One treatment of export behavior that has become increasingly common in tradefocused CGE models is to employ a constant elasticity of tra n s fo rm ation (CET) function. The CET function, whose form is analogous to the CES function, describes how sectoral production can be transformed into goods suitable for the domestic and export markets. Sectoral output is transformed into two different goods, each with its own price: P D for domestic output sold only on the domestic market and P E fo r exports (in domestic currency).
The small-country assumption can be retained for exports in that the domestic price of ex p o rts, P E, equals a fi xed wo rld price multiplied by the ex ch a n ge rate and any subsidy rate, but the price of output for domestic use , PD, will no longer be tied to the world market price. Producers want to maximize revenue from sales subject to the CET transformation function. The optimal division of domestic output into part for ex p o rt and part for domestic use will be a function of the ratio of P E to P D, the elasticity of transformation between the two uses, and the share parameters in the CET function.
D. Macro Balances
The CGE model includes the major macro balances: sav i n g s -i nve s t m e n t , gove rnment deficit, and the balance of tra d e. How these balances are re c o n c i l e d constitutes much of the subject matter of macroeconomic theory. In the literature on CGE models, the problem of achieving equilibrium among these macro aggregates is t e rmed the "macro cl o s u re" pro bl e m .
8 For our purposes, the pro blem is re l at ive ly s t ra i g h t fo r wa rd since we re ly on a sep a rate macro e c o n o m e t ric model to project the balance of trade, the government deficit, and aggregate investment. We "close" the CGE model by making these macro aggregates exogenous. Endogenously, the model solves for enterprise savings rates and the equilibrium real exchange rate to equilibrate savings-investment and the balance of trade.
In common with the neoclassical real trade model, the CGE model incorporates a functional relationship between the real exchange rate and the balance of trade. The real exchange rate is defined as the relative price of nontradeables to tradeables (PD for nontradeables and PM and PE for tradeables).
9 Ceteris paribus, an improvement in the balance of trade is associated with a real dep re c i ation. The CGE model can s o l ve only for re l at ive prices. We choose as the nu m e ra i re price index the GDP deflator for the base forward run and the aggregate price of domestic goods sold on the domestic market for the protection experiments.
10 Given the choice of numeraire, the model solves for the equilibrium nominal exchange rate. That is, the CGE model takes as exogenous any two of the following three variables: the aggregate price level, the balance of tra d e, and the nominal ex ch a n ge rat e. 1 1 We use the macro model to p roject the aggregate price level and the balance of tra d e, and let the CGE model determine the equilibrium exchange rate.
When we model unifo rm protection, there is a large increase in gove rn m e n t reve nue from tari ffs. In this case, we fix net gove rnment reve nue and reb ate the increased tariff revenue to households so that there are no macro feedbacks through the government account. When changing a tariff in a single sector, the change in tariff reve nue is small, so we do not bother to adjust aggregate gove rnment tra n s fe rs in those experiments.
E. Farm Programs
The standard approach to modeling government farm support programs in economywide models is to compute an ad valorem measure of the value of these programs to fa rm e rs and incorp o rate these as ex ogenous ad va l o rem rates into the behav i o ra l equations of the model. Kilkenny and Robinson (1988) argue that this approach can lead to serious erro rs in estimating the impact on the economy of ch a n ges in agricultural programs and in estimating changes in the cost of such programs given changes in macro conditions.
Instead of modeling agri c u l t u ral programs with an ad va l o re m we d ge, we have ex p l i c i t ly modeled seve ral of the va rious programs. The intent is to cap t u re the essential institutional features of the various programs. The model captures the major features of the deficiency payment program, export subsidies, and import quotas.
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In the model, the deficiency payments program applies to the cotton, food grains, and feed crops sectors. We simplify by assuming an ex ogenous part i c i p ation rat e. Producers participating in the program, having set aside the requisite acres, receive a target price for the commodities produced, rather than the market price. Equilibrium p roduction levels are in response to the fi xed target price rather than to the marke t price. As long as the market price remains below the target price, changes in production costs and market demand only influence the market price, while the target price remains the signal which guides producer behavior. The deficiency payment program distorts producer behavior in a way that is not captured by a fixed wedge. E x p o rt subsidies are modeled for the food grains, feed crops, meat pro c e s s i n g, grain milling (flour), and soy milling sectors. Export subsidies are tre ated as a d valorem wedges between the world price of U. S. exports and the price received by domestic producers. We assume that the export subsidy rates remain constant in all experiments.
Import quotas are modeled for the dairy processing and sugar processing sectors. In the 1988 base scenario, these import quotas are binding. For the optimistic trade s c e n a rio, we assume these quotas cease to be binding, due to the assumed re a l d eva l u ation. In the protectionist scenarios, protection takes the fo rm of a tari ff equivalent for these import quotas.
F. Model Calibr ation
The parameters of the 30-sector CGE model for the United States are calibrated to a 1988 data base. The calibration procedure is described in Robinson, Kilkenny, and Hanson (1990) . We started from a 1982 data base which was then updated to 1986 and 1988. The National Income and Product Accounts for 1986 and 1988 are used as m a c ro control totals for aggregation of sectoral stru c t u re. The 1986 and 1988 National Income and Product Accounts data are from the Survey of Current Business, July 1988 and February 1989, respectively . Sectoral output and employment data for 1986 and 1988 are taken from unpublished Bureau of Labor Statistics data. Table 1 presents the sectoral structure of the economy in 1988.
THEORY OF PROTECTION
The U. S. CGE model assumes downward-sloping demand curves for exports in 4 agricultural sectors out of 30 sectors in all. The United States is assumed to behave as a "small" country on world markets for the other export sectors, and for all imports. In theory, tariff protection for the four exporting agricultural sectors might be welfare improving, given the ability to affect international prices and assuming no retaliation from other countries. However, the model also incorporates a variety of other market d i s t o rtions, including existing tari ffs, indirect taxes, and distortions in the fa c t o r m a rkets. In ge n e ral, we cannot predict the aggregate we l fa re effect of ch a n ges in protection. Given empirical work with a variety of models, however, we can expect that the aggregate welfare effects will be small.
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While aggregate we l fa re effects are like ly to be small, protection can benefi t p a rticular groups in the economy at the expense of others. As demonstrated by Stolper and Samuelson (1941) , interest in protection should form according to factor intensities. For example, if the import good is labor intensive, then labor has a clear interest in an import tariff since the increase in the price of the import good will raise the real wage, while lowe ring the re t u rn to capital. Thus, there exists a potential tension over trade policy among factor owners, with the interest determined by factor intensities.
14 Alternatively, recent literature on rent seeking and pressure group models of trade p o l i cy fo rm ation has focused on models that incorp o rate a production stru c t u re characterized by specific factors.
15 With a sector-specific factor and a perfectly mobile factor, owners of the specific factor have a clear interest in protection for their own industry because such protection confers rents. They also have an interest in lower tariffs for all other industries because higher tariffs in other industries will cause the return to the specific factor in every industry but its own to fall. Thus, there exists a clear tension among owners of industry-specific factors over trade policy.
In our model, we do experiments in which capital is treated as sector-specific and, a l t e rn at ive ly, as inters e c t o ra l ly mobile. We can thus ex p l o re both the fa c t o rp ro p o rtions ve rsion of the argument with all fa c t o rs mobile and the sector-s p e c i fi c factor version. We do not, however, consider the case in which labor is also sectorspecific, nor do we consider models of imperfect competition.
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The literature in trade theory describing the effects of protection has concentrated almost exclusively on the case where imports are perfect substitutes for domestically p roduced commodities. In a model wh e re imports are imperfect substitutes fo r domestically produced commodities, the effect of an import tariff upon the price of the domestically produced substitute depends on the elasticity of substitution between the i m p o rt and domestic go o d, the import share, and the elasticity of demand for the composite good. In general, the larger the elasticity of substitution between imports and domestic commodities, and the larger the import share, then the larger will be the effect of changes in tariffs upon domestic prices. 17 In the U. S. model, the elasticities K. HANSON, S. ROBINSON AND S. TOKARICK 36 13 See the summary discussion in Srinivasan and Whalley (1986) . 1 4 Th e re is also a "mag n i fi c ation effect" that commodity price ch a n ges have upon fa c t o r p rices, an effect that ge n e ra l i zes to the mu l t i -c o m m o d i t y, mu l t i -factor case. See Jones and Scheinkman (1977) and Ethier (1974) .
1 5 The pro p e rties of the specific fa c t o rs or Ricard o -Viner model are discussed in Mussa (1974 ), Mayer (1974 ), and Jones (1971 . Empirical evidence in support of this view for the United States is presented in Magee (1978) .
16 See Melo and Tarr (1992) for a related U. S. CGE model in which they explicitly consider the effect of protection on sectors in which there is imperfect competition.
17 Melo and Robinson (1985) explore the relationships in a partial-equilibrium model. They s h ow that if the elasticity of substitution between imports and domestic commodities is less than the elasticity of demand for the composite commodity, then the price of the domestically of substitution between imports and domestic commodities are suffi c i e n t ly large to expect protection to be effective, but we expect protection to have a smaller impact than it would have in a model in which commodities are perfect substitutes.
In addition, any tariff increase should introduce an incentive bias against exports. This notion is at t ri bu t able to Lerner (1936) , who showed in a model with perfe c t substitutes that an import tari ff is symmetrical to an ex p o rt tax in its effects. Th i s result ge n e ra l i zes to an acro s s -t h e -b o a rd tari ff incre a s e, wh i ch should provide a general bias against exports.
We are interested in measuring the degree of protection afforded to an industry as a result of the sector-s p e c i fic ex p e riments. Looking solely at nominal sectoral tari ff s can be misleading because they do not account for the fact that industries may use inputs that are themselves subject to tariffs. Effective rate of protection measures, as formulated by Corden (1966) , provide an approximation to the change in value added resulting from a tari ff ch a n ge. We use the CGE model to calculate ex p l i c i t ly the change in value added due to tariff changes.
BASE SCENARIO WITH A FAVORABLE TRADE ENVIRONMENT
From 1988, we project fo r wa rd to 1995. The projections for macro aggregat e s come from a small multicountry macro model developed by Malley (1990) . The CGE model takes these macro projections as exogenous and determines the sectoral effects. The base projections to 1995 rep resent an optimistic trade env i ronment, pro j e c t i n g t h at the current account will move into surplus by 1995. An 18.1-percent nominal depreciation of the dollar (14.7-percent real depreciation) accompanies the movement to a trade surplus. This improvement in the balance of trade is a consequence of the assumed real depreciation in the base scenario, and, of course, could occur without the assumed growth over the re l evant peri o d. The model does not explain growth, bu t focusses on the structural implications of alternative exogenous macro scenarios. In terms of growth, the projection is conservative. Real GDP is projected to grow at 3.1 percent a year to 1991, then decline to 2.6 percent a year from 1991 to 1995. Total factor productivity g rowth is projected to account for less than half of total growth, a share somewhat lower than the long-run historical average.
The base scenario is large ly favo rable for agri c u l t u re. The agri c u l t u ral terms of trade measured using output prices are projected to improve by 6.3 percent by 1995 ( Fohlin, Robinson, and Sch l u t e r, 1989). The cost of fa rm programs is projected to d e cline by 2 billion in 1988 dollars. The decline is due to two fa c t o rs. Fi rst, the various reference prices (target prices and loan rates) against which market prices are c o m p a red in determining agri c u l t u ral support are projected to decline in real term s until 1991, thus lowering support levels. From 1991 to 1995, they are projected to rise only with average inflation. Second, agriculture is an export intensive sector and the ALTERNATIVE TRADE STRATEGIES 37 produced commodity will fall in response to a tariff increase and the tariff will fail to protect the domestic industry.
base scenario represents an optimistic trade environment. The growth in agricultural exports increases domestic agricultural prices, thus narrowing the gap between market prices and reference prices and lowering program costs.
PROTECTION EXPERIMENTS
Our fundamental macro assumption is that the U. S. trade deficit will be reduced during the early 1990's. We consider two alternatives through which the reduction in the trade deficit is ach i eve d. In the base run projections to 1995 in the prev i o u s section, we assume the improvement in the balance of trade is accompanied by a d ep re c i ation of the dollar, with no ch a n ge in tari ff stru c t u re. In the altern at ive scenario in this section, we assume that the United States achieves the same balance of trade by restricting imports.
Using 1995 as a point in time when the trade deficit is eliminated with either strategy, we compare the protection experiments with the base scenario in 1995. It is impossible to predict the mix of quantitative and tariff restrictions that might emerge if the present round of GATT negotiations fails. 18 We use a simple approach of imposing a 50-percent tariff which is added to the existing tariff in affected sectors. The idea is not to project wh at might actually happen, but to ex p l o re the stru c t u ral impact of following a protectionist regime. In all experiments. the balance of trade is fixed in world prices and the real exchange rate adjusts to achieve equilibrium g iven the trade balance.
We perform two kinds of comparative static experiments. The first set of experiments imposes "sector-s p e c i fic" protection. In seven sep a rate ex p e riments, a 50-percent tariff is added to the existing tariff in seven sectors, keeping all other tariffs at existing levels. In the second set of ex p e riments, "ove rall" protection, all sectors receive a 50-percent tariff on top of existing tariffs. We consider two versions of the overall protection experiment: one in which sectoral capital is assumed to be sectorspecific and one in which capital is assumed to be mobile among sectors. The idea behind the two sets of experiments is to compare what might happen when each sector seeking protection in its own self interest succeeds in having policymakers increase tariffs, leading to a situation in which all sectors simultaneously receive protection.
A. Sector -Specif ic Protection
In each sector-s p e c i fic protection ex p e riment, we perfo rm a comparat ive stat i c experiment from the 1995 base, individually adding a 50-percent tariff to each sector. The ove rall balance of trade is assumed unch a n ge d, capital is sector specifi c, and labor is mobile across sectors.
S even sectors are chosen for the single-sector protection ex p e riments: dairy p ro c e s s i n g, sugar pro c e s s i n g, crude and re fined petroleum, other nondurabl e m a nu fa c t u ring (wh i ch includes textiles and ap p a rel), metal manu fa c t u ring (wh i ch i n cludes iron and steel), consumer electronics (wh i ch includes computers and household appliances), and tra n s p o rt ation equipment (wh i ch includes ve h i cles and aircraft). We choose these sectors because either they have large trade shares or they have historically achieved significant protection from imports. Table 2 rep o rts results from the ex p e riments. The ch a n ge in the ex ch a n ge rat e i l l u s t rates the macro impact, wh i ch is slight. Th ree sectors have a large enough i m p o rt share so that increased sectoral protection leads to an ap p re c i ation of the exchange rate. The larger effects range from 1.7 to 3.4 percent. Changes in sectoral p rotection result in ve ry small ch a n ges in real GDP, since each individual sector is "small" in the total economy. Of cours e, to the extent that protection results in an inefficient use of resources, protection lowers real GDP.
The impact of sector-s p e c i fic protection is pri m a ri ly on the sector itself. Th e increase in protection is certainly significant. The change in value added is positive and greater than 10 percent for five of the seven sectors. While protection in every case leads to an increase in the domestic pri c e, the increase is mu ch less than the increase in the price of the imported substitute. With the exceptions of petroleum and d a i ry pro c e s s i n g, at the new equilibrium, the perc e n t age increase in production is ALTERNATIVE TRADE STRATEGIES 39 mu ch gre ater than the increase in domestic pri c e. Consumer electronics is an especially dramatic case, with an equilibrium increase in production of 71.8 percent.
It is also the sector with the highest import share. The increased sectoral protection does generate an incentive bias against exporting. In eve ry case, the ratio of the price on the domestic market to that on the ex p o rt m a rket (PD/PE) increases. In the four manu fa c t u ring sectors, howeve r, the ge n e ra l increase in supply incentives due to the import protection actually leads to an increase in output and exports, even though the change in relative prices leads to a fall in the sectoral export share.
When sectoral protection leads to an ap p re c i ation of the dollar, defi c i e n cy payments to cotton, food grains, and feed crops rise. The appreciation of the dollar lowers the export price in these sectors which widens the gap between the exogenous t a rget price and the market pri c e. Production in these sectors remains unch a n ge d since production decisions are based on the exogenous target price. The larger gap b e t ween the target price and the market price combined with no fall in pro d u c t i o n leads to higher deficiency payments.
The increased protection does benefit the affected sector in every case. Demand for the variable factor, labor, increases, leading to significant increases in employment in the protected sectors. The re t u rn to the fi xed fa c t o r, capital, also incre a s e s s i g n i fi c a n t ly. Consumer electronics is again the most dra m atic case, with pro fi t s i n c reasing by 32.3 percent and employment by 85.1 percent. If labor we re also modeled as sector specific, one would expect the sectoral wage to rise dramatically instead of employment. In any case, protection works in that it greatly benefits the protected sectors. The effect is least for dairy processing, in which quotas and other nontariff barriers cause the initial import share to be very small (2.9 percent), so there is little scope for further import substitution, rega rdless of the elasticity of substitution.
Interindustry flows link sectors, spreading the impact of protection among users of the output and suppliers of inputs. The suppliers of inputs to the protected sector gain f rom protection through an increase in demand. For instance, protection for dairy p rocessing increases production and value added for dairy fa rm e rs and feed cro p growe rs. Sectors that compete for the same inputs as those used by dairy fa rm e rs , such as livestock competing for feed crops, experience a fall in production and value added from the protection. The higher costs of inputs (feed crops) reduce value added to livestock producers and meat processors, but the effect is small relative to the gains of the dairy-related sectors.
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Those sectors which use the commodities of a protected sector as inputs have to pay a higher price, increasing their costs. The effects of the higher costs on the using i n d u s t ries are lower production and higher producer prices, with a net effect of reducing value add e d. For instance, the composite price paid by users of the commodity in the protected metal manufacturing sector increases by 7.6 percent, as given in table 2. The effects on other industrial sectors that use metal products, such as the mach i n e ry industry and the auto industry (not shown), are reductions in production of 2.5 percent and 4.3 percent, respectively, and an increase in producer price of 1 percent in each sector.
As seen by the sector specific experiments, those sectors with large import shares have a strong incentive to lobby for protection. The adverse effect of protection on other sectors is smaller, suggesting less incentive to try and bl o ck the pro t e c t i o n . What happens when all sectors succeed in gaining protection is examined in the next section.
B. Overall Protection
In the overall protection experiments, all sectors receive a 50-percent tariff on top of any existing tariff. As discussed above, the balance of trade, nominal investment, and nominal net government revenue are all fixed at their 1995 base run levels. As a result, the increase in ove rall protection is not allowed to ch a n ge the macro aggregates. The model is designed to determine the structural impact of protection: its e ffect on the volume and stru c t u re of tra d e, demand, and production, and on the equilibrium exchange rate. We perform two versions of the overall experiment: one with sector-specific capital and one with mobile capital.
Aggregate indicators from the two overall protection experiments are given in table 3. There is a very small (0.25 percent) fall in real GDP, with a slightly greater loss when capital is mobile across sectors. This loss in real GDP is a consequence of inefficiencies in production induced by the higher tariffs. Protection changes relative p rices, increasing the producer price of import intensive sectors re l at ive to other sectors, which causes the output of the protected sectors to expand and attract factors of production. The movement of factors into the import intensive sectors may or may not result in a fall in real GDP, depending on the productivity of factors employed in these sectors. As described earlier, the model allows factor productivity, and hence, factor prices to differ across sectors. Empirically, the data we use to specify the return to factors show that labor earns a lower return in the import intensive sectors, relative to the rest of the economy. Thus, protection directs resources from higher value to lower value uses.
In theory, one would expect a distortion to induce greater efficiency losses when more factors are free to adjust to the distorted incentives. This is indeed the case, and this point is demonstrated in the experiments performed here. Given the large number of existing distortions though, this result need not obtain. From the theory of the second best, adding a distortion, i.e. protection, with other distortions already in place , could actually raise we l fa re if it directs re s o u rces into uses wh e re their value of marginal product is higher than in the initial, distorted equilibrium. The model used h e re contains a large number of initial distortions, such as indirect taxes, tari ff s , quotas, export subsidies, deficiency programs, and labor market distortions. Since it is d i fficult to determine the effects of protection given the large number of initial d i s t o rtions, it is ap p ro p ri ate to determine the effects using an empirical ge n e ra l equilibrium model.
In both experiments, the additional across-the-board 50-percent tariff causes a 13-percent appreciation of the dollar and about a 28-percent fall in both real exports and imports (calculating from table 3). Nominal exports and imports both fall about 37 percent. As theory suggests, a general tariff effectively imposes a tax on exports and leads to a reduction in the volume of trade.
Except for the agricultural sectors, world prices of commodities are fixed, following the small-country assumption. The domestic export price index consequently falls with the ap p re c i ation of the dollar. The domestic import price index rises with the Notes: Overall protection is modeled with a 50-percent tariff added to all imports, across the board. "Fixed capital" assumes capital is sector-specific. In "mobile capital," both capital and labor are mobile across sectors.
tariff and appreciation of the dollar. The change in the ratio of the domestic export p rice index to the domestic import price index measures the incentive bias aga i n s t ex p o rting induced by the tari ff. This index of "effe c t ive trade bias" is defined by Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1979: 6) . In both experiments, this index stands at 1.48. 20 While in these experiments the incentive bias arises only from the tariff, the effect of quantitative controls that yielded a similar fall in imports would yield a similar trade bias value. Any restriction on imports generates a corresponding tax on exports. Table 4 rep o rts the stru c t u ral impact of ove rall protection in the sector-s p e c i fi c capital case. In general, sectors with high import shares gain, while those with high export shares lose. Overall, the industrial sector loses. Consumer electronics is the largest gainer in percentage terms and also has the largest import share. Transportation equipment has high import and export shares and is a net loser. Three sectors h ave high import shares, but lose sectoral income nonetheless: petroleum, other d u rables, and metal manu fa c t u ri n g. These lose because they provide interm e d i at e inputs to sectors whose outputs fall, and hence who generate less demand for intermediate inputs.
Note that aggregate nominal value added falls by 3.8 percent. This result is a statistical phenomenon. In the U. S. national income and product accounts, tariffs are included as part of value added in the trade services sector. In table 4, however, we do not report the large change in tariff collections, which amounts to about 3 percent of G D P, as part of the ch a n ge in value added in this sector. The ch a n ge in aggregat e value added reported in table 4 thus appears larger than in the GDP accounts.
The Agricultural Sectors
The agri c u l t u ral sectors are adve rs e ly affected by ove rall protection. Th e agricultural terms of trade, which measure agricultural prices relative to prices in the rest of the economy, fall about 5 percent (for both experiments and for both output and value-added prices). Deficiency payments, the major farm program, are keyed to the difference between the market price and a fixed reference price, the target price. In this policy environment, the fall in agricultural market prices in the overall-protection experiments generates an increase in farm program costs. The aggregate cost of farm programs doubles (table 3) and the increase in agricultural subsidies reduces the fall in income in the agricultural sectors compared with the fall in value added (table 4).
All the agricultural sectors that have significant export shares lose sector income. O ve rall, real agri c u l t u ral output increases slightly, but value added and income fa l l . Output of the cotton, feed crops, and other crops sectors increases, but these sectors still have lower incomes because of the fall in prices. The food grains and oilseed c rops sectors ex p e rience a fall in both production and sector income. The only agricultural sectors which experience a rise in sector income are dairy, livestock, and sugar.
As for the agricultural gainers, there is an increase in demand for sugar crops by s u gar pro c e s s o rs, due to the reduction in imports of processed suga r. Dairy and livestock producers gain as a result of an increase in domestic demand. The price of feed crops falls, reducing the cost of dairy and livestock production.
The results for the oilseed crops sector illustrate the impact of a reduction in ex p o rts on an ex p o rt intensive sector not subject to a fa rm program. Among the agri c u l t u ral sectors, the oilseed crops sector ex p e riences the largest reduction in production and sector income.
The deficiency payments pr ogram distorts production decisions in the cotton, food grains, and feed crops sectors in that producers respond to the fixed target price rather than the market price. The appreciation of the dollar resulting from overall protection l owe rs market prices. With lower market prices and fi xed target prices, defi c i e n cy payments increase. Government income payments to these sectors help cushion the loss in value added, as can be seen by comparing sector income with value added for these sectors in table 4.
The diffe rential impact on production for these sectors depends on interi n d u s t ry linkages. Output of cotton increases despite the reduction in exports. The reason is that protection increases the demand for domestically produced textiles and apparel, part of the other nondurable goods sector, which uses cotton as an intermediate input.
Sectors which use feed crops as an intermediate input, such as the dairy and livestock sectors, experience an increase in production from protection, increasing the production of feed crops. Output of food grains falls slightly given the reduction in exports and a slight fall in domestic demand by the grain milling and miscellaneous fo o d processing sectors.
Mobile Capital
The structural impact of pursuing a protectionist trade strategy is quite dramatic, even with re s t rictions on factor mobility wh i ch limit the ability of the economy to respond to the changed incentives. Allowing capital mobility leads to a larger output adjustment in almost eve ry sector. Howeve r, the diffe rences are not large in most sectors.
Whether or not capital mobility is assumed, the effect of ove rall protection on e c o n o mywide ave rage wage and pro fit rates is neg l i gi bl e. In the mobile-cap i t a l experiment, the average profit rate fell by less than half a percent and the real wage did not ch a n ge (nu m b e rs not tabu l ated). With sector specific capital, there was no ch a n ge in either the ave rage wage or ave rage pro fit rat e. The effect of ove ra l l p rotection on real factor re t u rns depends on the net effects of protecting both lab o r and capital intensive industries. According to the Stolper-S a muelson theore m , protection for an industry will raise the real return to the factor used intensively in that industry. With both capital and labor intensive industries protected, the net effects on real factor returns tend to balance out. Another reason for the negligible effects on real factor returns is that, with extensive input-output linkages, changes in protection are diffused across the economy.
The model results, howeve r, do lend support to the notion that sector-s p e c i fi c fa c t o rs gain signifi c a n t ly from protection. While there is cl e a rly an incentive fo r i n d ividual sectors to seek protection, there are also risks. Fi g u re 1 ch a rts sectora l value added when there is a 50-percent tariff on each sector singly versus an acrosst h e -b o a rd tari ff. The diffe rences are stri k i n g. Acro s s -t h e -b o a rd protection is mu ch less beneficial to these sectors. In four cases, the sign is reve rsed and the sector actually loses value added. These experiments indicate the fallacy of composition of protectionist arguments. Protection that benefits an individual sector only does so if other sectors are not also protected.
CONCLUSION
The results from these ex p e riments yield a few lessons for policy m a ke rs. Th e United States has undergone a va riety of macro shocks in the 1980's, incl u d i n g dramatic increases in the Federal budget deficit and trade deficit. These shocks and concomitant policy reactions led to major changes in the real exchange rate, relative p rices, volume of tra d e, and sectoral stru c t u re of production, imports, and ex p o rt s . Current macro projections, which provide the starting point for our analysis, indicate continuing macro swings into the 1990's as the United States seeks to adjust its macro balances.
We have used the CGE model to trace out the implications of alternative forms of " s t ru c t u ral adjustment" to the ch a n ging macro env i ronment. Implicit in the macro projections is a fairly optimistic trade scenario in which the United States pursues an open trade strat egy in an env i ronment of liberal wo rld tra d e. In this scenari o , aggregate ex p o rts and imports grow faster than GDP and the economy pursues a successful strategy of export-led growth.
An alternative is that the world trading environment worsens and that the United States gives in to domestic protectionist pressures. Our experiments tracing out the implications of this scenario indicate a dramatic decline in the volume of trade, with a relative decline in aggregate industrial output and serious damage to exporting sectors, including agriculture. The cost of programs to support agriculture roughly double, as gove rnment support policies keyed to the diffe rence between market and re fe re n c e prices for agriculture kick in.
Our results also indicate that the existence of protectionist pre s s u res is cert a i n ly u n d e rs t a n d abl e. Sectors cl e a rly gain if they can ach i eve protection without any change in policies affecting other sectors. However, the risks are high. If lobbying for p a rticular sectoral protection leads to a ge n e ral increase in tari ffs or re s t rictions on i m p o rts, the sectoral implications are mu ch less beneficial or positive ly harm f u l . What works for one does not work for all.
